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ABSTRACT
       We use the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to estimate a model of household demand for
employer-based health insurance, explicitly investigating differences in behavior between households
with two potential sources of coverage and those with one source. Own and cross-price elasticities are
estimated for three types of health plans, including exclusive provider organizations, any provider
organizations, and mixed provider organizations. We find that the premium, family size, income, and
wealth significantly affect demand. Our elasticity estimates reveal an overall, small behavioral response
to changes in price with respect to health plan switching and take-up. Finally, we discuss the implications
of our findings with respect to employer benefit design.
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I.        Introduction 
A key issue in health policy and health economics has been the question of the 
uninsured.  Over 43 million Americans are without health insurance coverage, and that 
number has been growing over time (Rhoades et al, 2002, Hoffman and Schlobohm, 
2000).  There have been many proposals aimed at reducing the number of Americans 
without health insurance.  A prominent feature of many of these proposals is to offer 
subsidies in the form of tax credits or vouchers for the purchase of health insurance.  
How effective these policies may be depends critically on the price sensitivity of demand 
for health insurance (Chernew et al, 1997, Blumberg et al, 2002).   In addition, 
employers’ policies towards health insurance offerings for their employees, particularly 
the question of how much of premium costs employees should pay, are also critically 
dependent on price sensitivity. 
In this paper, we take advantage of a new data resource, the 1996 Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), recently released by the U.S. Agency for Health Care 
Research and Quality (AHRQ).  This is a nationally representative comprehensive survey 
of individuals and employers, and represents the most recent nationally representative 
data on insurance offerings and individuals’ choices.   Additionally, we explicitly 
consider the choices of two-earner households.  Due to dramatic increases in female labor 
force participation, the majority of married households have two earners.
2   As the 
proportion of households with two earners rises, so does the proportion of households 
with two potential sources of employer-based health insurance (EBHI) coverage.   For 
                                                 
2 In 1998 the Census Bureau reported that in approximately 60% of non-elderly families, both spouses were 
employed (Casper and Bryson, 1998).   3
many families, and particularly for those with two potential coverage sources, decisions 
about whether to take up coverage and which plan or plans to choose are likely to be 
made jointly by both workers in the household, rather than by an individual worker.
3   
Last, few studies have been able to address the substitutability in demand of 
different kinds of health insurance plans (e.g., conventional health insurance like Blue 
Cross vs. HMOs).  This information is important for benefit design by either government 
or private employers.  It is also critical for market definition and has been notably lacking 
in some recent antitrust cases.
4   By virtue of having employees’ full range of choices and 
their characteristics in the data, we can recover this information. 
Thus, we use the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to estimate a 
model of household demand for employer-based health insurance.  This allows us to  
identify the set of health plan and household attributes that influence decision-making, 
explicitly investigating differences in behavior between households with two potential 
sources of coverage and those with one source.  We also estimate a set of own and cross-
price elasticities of demand for three types of health plans including exclusive provider 
organizations (e.g., HMOs), mixed provider organizations (e.g., PPOs), and any provider 
organizations (e.g., conventional fee-for-service plans). 
                                                 
3 In related work, Abraham and Royalty (2002) find significant differences in the number and types of 
employer-based plans available to two-earner families as compared to other households, suggesting the 
importance of taking account of the full range of choices available when trying to understand how families 
make decisions about their health insurance. 
4 See for example Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin and Compcare Health Services 
Insurance Corporation vs. Marshfield Clinic and Security Health Plan of Wisconsin, Inc.  U.S. Court of 
Appeals, 7
th Circuit, Nos. 95-1965, 95-2140.  http://usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f0400/0421.htm 
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In what follows, we first briefly survey the literature on health insurance demand 
(Section II).  We then describe our econometric approach in Section III.  The data and 
variable descriptions are contained in Section IV.  Section V reports descriptive statistics 
and the econometric results.  Finally, Section VI contains discussion and concluding 
remarks.     
II. Previous  Literature 
The health insurance demand literature is large.
 5  Many of the early studies, 
including Juba et al (1980), McGuire (1981), Holmer (1984), Hershey et al (1984), 
Welch (1986), Marquis and Phelps (1987), Long  et al (1988), Short and Taylor (1989), 
Taylor and Wilensky (1983), Farley and Wilensky (1984), Grazier (1986), Barringer and 
Mitchell (1994) and Deb et al (1996), examine the decisions of workers among offered 
plans, and find that factors including the price of coverage, cost-sharing provisions, 
income, health status, and demographic characteristics affect health plan choice.
6   
Focusing on decision-making within a managed care environment, Feldman et al 
(1989) used data on 3,000 employees from 17 firms in Minneapolis to estimate a nested 
logit model of health plan choice.  They found price elasticities in the range of -.53 to 
 -.15 for a firm with a 50 percent market share.  Other studies examining health plan 
choice and switching behavior by university employees include Royalty and Solomon 
                                                 
5 Scanlon (1997) and Morrisey (1992) provide excellent reviews. 
6 Feldstein (1973), Phelps (1976) and Goldstein and Pauly (1976) are the three earliest studies of health 
insurance demand, but data limitations suggest caution with respect to interpretation of their empirical 
results.  Two other studies [Ellis (1989) and  Marquis and Holmer (1996)] have also examined demand, but 
used prospect theory rather that the more conventional expected utility theory to model the decision-
making process.   5
(1999), Cutler and Reber (1998), and Buchmueller and Feldstein (1997).  All three 
studies found that employees, on average, were price-elastic with respect to their demand 
for coverage.
7,8   
  To date, few studies have considered the influence of having two potential 
sources of coverage on employee and household decision-making.  Blumberg et al (2002) 
use the 1996 MEPS to analyze a worker’s decision to take up any coverage.  They found 
that a worker was significantly less likely to take up coverage through her place of 
employment if her spouse was also offered insurance at work.  Additionally, they found a 
small price elasticity between  -.09 to -.01.   Using earlier data from the 1987 National 
Medical Expenditure Survey, Monheit et al (1999) investigated a household’s decision to 
take up two policies that together provided “double coverage,” in which at least one 
household member was covered under both policies.  They found that the probability of a 
household having double coverage was positively related to at least one  policy having a 
zero contribution requirement. 
Dranove et al (2000) argued that, given a greater proportion of households with 
two-sources of coverage, employers would provide less generous coverage or require 
higher contributions in order to encourage employees to take up coverage with their 
                                                 
7 Royalty and Solomon (1999) estimate own-price elasticities between -.96 to –1.753.  Cutler and Reber 
(1998) find that a one percent increase in premium led to a two percent decrease in plan enrollment.  
Buchmueller and Feldstein (1996) find that 26% of health plan enrollees will switch to a cheaper plan when 
the monthly premium for their own plan rises by $10. 
8 One critique of these aforementioned studies is with respect to the generalizability of their results, given 
that they use data from a single organization or geographic market.   
   6
spouse’s employer.  They developed a theoretical model relating firm size, employee 
contribution, and the tax subsidy associated with EBHI, and tested a set of predictions 
using data from the 1993 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Employer Health Insurance 
Survey.  Their results suggest that employee contributions are higher when more 
employees have working spouses and firms that have higher costs of insurance tend to 
have disproportionately higher contributions.
9 
This study extends the literature on four margins.  First, we estimate a model 
using a recent, national sample of households and their employers, providing variation in 
premiums that is independent of plan characteristics.  Second, by using the household as 
the unit of analysis, we are able to identify a more complete picture of the choices faced 
by household members and to control for household level factors that influence demand.  
Third, we explicitly investigate potential differences in behavior between households 
with two potential sources of coverage and those with one.  Finally, after estimating own 
and cross-price elasticities, we evaluate the potential impact of changes in employer 
contributions or government subsidies on health plan switching, including the take-up of 
health insurance coverage. 
III.       Econometric Model 
We employ the random utility model of consumer choice (McFadden, 1974).  We 
presume that households maximize expected utility and that employment status is 
                                                 
9 Gruber and McKnight (2002) estimate a model to examine the rise in employee contributions between 
1982-1996.  They find some empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that as an employee’s outside 
options increase, including having coverage through a spouse, required contributions also rise.     7
exogenous.
10  Under well-known conditions, this allows us to recover households’ 
preference parameters by estimating the determinants of choice.  We assume that the 
errors in the model are additive and distributed i.i.d. Weibull, thus leading to a 
multinomial logit specification.  In what follows, we estimate the standard multinomial 
logit model of consumer choice.
11  Since the logit model can suffer from problems due to 
the imposed assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), we also 
estimate a nested logit specification and test for the violation of the IIA (Hausman, 1978).   
In the standard model of health insurance demand the key determinants of 
household choice of health insurance plan (including no employer sponsored coverage) 
are money and health (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000).  Money consists of household 
income net of health care expenses.  These expenses may include an employee 
contribution toward the total premium, as well as out-of-pocket spending, which depends 
on the price of medical care and cost-sharing provisions of the chosen plan.  Health state 
depends on the medical care consumption of household members, demographic 
                                                 
10 In this model we do not explicitly consider the intra-household decision-making process, which would 
allow one to more clearly understand the aggregation of preferences across household members regarding 
their coverage decisions. 
 
11 In multinomial logit models, recovering parameter estimates for attributes that do not vary across 
alternatives (e.g., household characteristics) is achieved by interacting those factors with a set of indicator 
variables corresponding to options in the choice set.  However, because households’ choice sets vary in this 
analysis, this would lead to too many parameters to estimate.  We therefore employ an alternative approach.  
Specifically, each household characteristic is interacted with three plan characteristics corresponding to 
provider type, coverage type, and an indicator variable for the outside good (e.g., not taking up EBHI).  
This accomplishes the same goal without suffering from the “curse of dimensionality.”    8
characteristics, and a random shock parameter that captures some loss of health by one or 
more household members during the coverage period that can be restored at least 
partially with medical care.   
When considering its coverage decision, the household must first identify the set 
of available plan choices.  We define a household’s choice set to consist of all 
combinations of health plans offered to employed members, as well as the choice of not 
taking up any employer-based coverage (“outside good”).  The outside good 
encompasses several possibilities, including public insurance, non-group coverage, and 
choosing to go without insurance.  For households with one source of employer provided 
health insurance, the choice set consists of the set of k plans offered by the employer and 
the outside good.  The choice set is more complex for households with two-sources of 
health insurance.  It consists of k
1*k
2 possible combinations of coverage, where the 
superscript denotes an employer source, as well as the outside good (not taking up 
employer-provided coverage).   
 
IV. Data 
A.  Data Description 
We use two components of the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to 
estimate the model (http://www.meps.ahrq.gov, 2002).  The first is the Household 
Component (HC), which is a random sample of the civilian non-institutionalized 
population of the United States, containing individual level data on demographic 
characteristics, employment status, health status, healthcare coverage, and medical care 
utilization for 22,601 individuals in approximately 11,000 households.    Our definition of   9
a household is based on the constructed Health Insurance Eligibility Unit (HIEU) 
identifier contained in the data file.  Specifically, an HIEU is a sub-family relationship 
unit constructed to include adults plus those family members who would typically be 
eligible for coverage under private family plans.  These family members include spouses, 
unmarried natural or adopted children who are age 18 or under, and children under age 24 
who are full-time students.   
Household survey respondents who indicated that they were employed were asked for 
contact information regarding their place of employment, as well as permission to contact 
their employer.  Employers of these household respondents were then surveyed and the 
results were compiled into the MEPS Insurance Component (IC) database.  For the 
MEPS-IC, information was collected on up to four health plans for employees of private 
establishments and all plans offered by public employers.  Information was collected on 
the total premium, employee contribution, plan type (exclusive provider organization, 
mixed provider organization, any choice of provider organization), coinsurance, 
deductibles, and covered benefits for plans that were both chosen and not chosen by the 
employee.    Employers were also asked to verify employee eligibility and to confirm the 
plan and coverage type held by the employee. 
While the data have substantial advantages over other sources, they suffer from one 
key limitation.  The sample of workers with complete information contained on the IC is 
not nationally representative due to a high rate of non-response on the combined 
surveys.
12  Some workers refused to grant permission for the surveyors to contact their 
                                                 
12 Due to this non-response, the MEPS-IC is considered a confidential database and is only available for use 
at the CCFS Data Center of AHRQ in Washington, DC.    10
employer, while others provided incomplete or inaccurate contact information.  
Furthermore, some employers chose not to respond to certain items on the IC, which are 
necessary for estimating models of health plan choice (e.g., confirming which plan was 
held).   
Our study population includes households in which one or more members are 
between the ages of 19 and 64, employed, and eligible to purchase employer-based 
healthcare coverage.  We classify households into two groups.  The first consists of 
households with one potential source of employer group coverage (“one-source” 
households).  These include single member households, married households in which 
exactly one spouse is employed and eligible for coverage, and married households in 
which there are two earners, but only one is eligible to purchase insurance.  The second 
group includes households with two workers who are both eligible to purchase coverage 
(“two-source” households). 
After merging the data files and checking for missing information, the final sample 
consists of 1,481 one-source households and 232 two-source households.   A set of 
descriptive statistics was tabulated to examine potential differences between those 
households included in the final sample and those that were excluded due to incomplete 
information.  For the one-source households, those included in the final sample have 
higher income, more serious medical conditions, and are more likely to have a federal 
government worker in the household.  No statistically significant differences were 
identified for the two-source households.   11
B.  Choice Sets 
  Table 1 provides the distribution of the number of plans available to households 
in the final sample.  Of the 1,481 households with one source of coverage, approximately 
55% have more than one plan from which to choose, and by definition all two-source 
households have plan choice.  In the decision-making process, households must also 
select the type of coverage (e.g., single or family).  This is an important consideration 
since it not only affects who is covered but typically the required contribution too.  
Therefore, we define each “option” in a one source household’s choice set to consist of 
the combination of a particular plan and coverage type (e.g., Plan A-single coverage, Plan 
A-family coverage) plus the outside good.  For two-source households, the choice set is 
more complex since it consists of all possible combinations of plan-coverage type options 
belonging to each of the workers in the household plus the outside good.  These 
households may choose to take up coverage from neither, one, or both employer sources, 
and/or may choose to take up plans with different combinations of coverage types such as 
two single policies, one single and one family policy, or two family policies.
13   
C.  Explanatory Variables 
Several household attributes may affect demand.  The relevant price for analyzing 
household behavior is the annual, employee contribution toward the total premium.
14 
 For 
                                                 
13 For this analysis, we assume that employment and healthcare coverage options are exogenous.  In 
particular, if workers sort into jobs or there is sorting within households based on particular preferences 
regarding the trade-off between wage and non-wage benefits, this may bias the parameter estimates.     
14 The MEPS IC asks employers to report the contribution for an “average full-time employee,” which may 
or may not accurately reflect what the particular household member would pay.  However, through 
discussions with MEPS surveyors, we have been informed that among establishments offering coverage to   12
options that include two plans, we use the sum of the employee contributions for our 
measure of price.  We also include a set of interaction terms of the contribution with our 
household attributes, which are described below.  Health care plans vary in terms of their 
cost-sharing provisions, such as coinsurance and deductibles.  For one-source 
households, we include a measure of the coinsurance rate and deductible for outpatient 
care.  For options that include two plans, average deductible and coinsurance measures 
for the plans are specified. 
In recent years, growing dissatisfaction with limited provider access in managed 
care plans has led to the development of new types of coverage that allow for greater 
freedom of choice of providers.   In the MEPS-IC, plans are classified into one of three 
categories corresponding to provider organizational structure.  These categories include 
exclusive provider organizations (EPOs), any provider organizations (ANY), and 
organizations that are a mixture of exclusive and any providers (MIX).  These categories 
are analogous to Health Maintenance Organizations, conventional fee-for-service plans, 
and Preferred Provider Organizations or Point-of-Service plans, respectively.  As a way 
to capture households’ preferences for these products, we include a variable in the model 
corresponding to an option having freedom of choice (FOC) of provider.  This variable 
combines the last two organizational structures above.    
To control for which household members are covered by a plan option, we specify 
an indicator variable for family coverage in the one-source household specification.  
Again, since two-source households may choose two plans, we use information on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
all workers, only a small percentage vary contribution requirements between full-time and part-time 
workers who are offered insurance.    13
number of household members and coverage type associated with each plan to construct 
a variable for whether an option provides coverage for the entire household or only 
partial household coverage.
15    Finally, we include an indicator variable to identify the 
outside good option in each household’s choice set. 
Several household characteristics are included.  First, household size should 
influence preferences regarding the selection of single or family coverage.  Measured as a 
binary variable, for one-source households it equals one if the household has a single 
member, zero otherwise; for two-source households, it equals one if the household has 
two members, zero otherwise.
16  Since our one-source households are more 
heterogeneous in terms of their demographic characteristics, we include a measure for 
whether household members are married.  And for both household types, we include the 
number of children under the age of 18.   
Given the interrelated nature of medical care consumption and health insurance 
demand, we include a measure of health status, defined as the number of serious medical 
conditions per capita in the household.
17   Poorer health may be positively associated with 
taking up coverage, and potentially more comprehensive coverage in order to protect 
against financial losses associated with anticipated medical expenses. 
                                                 
15 Very few of our two-source households chose to take up options with partial coverage or no coverage 
(outside good).  As a result, these two categories were combined.  
16 Several household size measures were considered, including categorical and continuous versions.  The 
decision to use binary measures was based on the results of likelihood ratio tests. 
17 Possible medical conditions include stroke, cancer, heart disease, gall bladder disease, high blood 
pressure, arteriosclerosis, rheumatism, emphysema, arthritis, and diabetes.   14
  Income and wealth are also hypothesized to influence demand.  Purchasing 
insurance is consistent with having diminishing marginal utility of income and risk 
aversion.  Following Holmer (1984), we include the natural log of household wage 
income.  Without any direct measures of household wealth, we use tax filing status to 
proxy for it.  Our rationale is that households filing a 1040 form are more likely to have 
investment income that requires them to do so (e.g., capital gains distributions).  We 
include an indicator variable to control for whether at least one individual in the 
household is employed by the federal government.  For these individuals, information on 
their health plan options and contribution were coded directly by survey administrators, 
rather than through the standard interview procedure used in data collection.  Finally,   
we interact each household characteristic with three indicator variables corresponding to 
plan type, coverage type, and the outside good.     
V. Results   
A.  Descriptive Analysis 
Tables 2 and 3 provide summary statistics for the household and plan 
characteristics.  Two-source households are more likely to be married (1 vs. .48) and 
have higher income ($62,684 vs. $38,186).   One-source households face slightly higher 
premium contributions on average for single coverage than do two-source households 
($380 vs. $334), while there are smaller differences in family coverage contributions.  In 
our sample, approximately 41% of one-source households have access to a free (zero 
premium contribution) single coverage plan and 21% have access to free family 
coverage.  An even greater percentage of two-source households have access, with 56% 
and 29% having free single and family coverage options, respectively.    15
  For both household types, approximately 53% of available plans are EPOs, 38% 
are MIX provider types, and eight percent of plans allow access to any provider.  
However, if we more closely examine each household’s set of options, it is clear that 
two-source households have a wider range of choices of plan types.  For example, 44% of 
our two-source households have both a managed care and a non-managed care plan from 
which to choose, in contrast to only 18% of one-source households.  
Figures 1 and 2 show the coverage and plan types held by the one and two-source 
households, respectively.  For those households with one source of coverage, 91% take 
up the offered coverage, with almost half choosing single coverage and the remaining 
selecting family coverage.  Of those holding coverage, 38% chose EPOs, 47% selected 
plans with a mixture of exclusive and any providers, and the remaining selected any 
provider plans.  For two-source households, approximately 97% take up EBHI and, of 
those, 56% select an option with two plans.  For the subset holding two plans, nearly 68% 
take up a combination of coverage that provides “double-coverage” for at least one 
member of the family.    
B.  Model Estimates 
  Tables 4 and 5 contain the multinomial logit model estimates.
18   Among one-
source households, we find that those with higher income and more serious medical 
                                                 
18 One methodological concern about the multinomial logit is the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
assumption.  This assumption implies that unobserved variations in the characteristics of alternative choices 
are independently distributed, such that the relative probability of choosing any option is independent of the 
other choices available to the household.  We also estimated nested logit models for both groups of 
households.  For one source households the nesting structure corresponded to choosing to take-up coverage 
or not, and for two source households the nesting structure corresponded to selecting a plan with freedom   16
conditions are more likely to take up employer-based coverage (less likely to choose the 
outside good), while households with a federal government worker are less likely to do 
so.  Additionally, households that are married and those having more children are more 
likely to choose family coverage, relative to single coverage.  Regarding the type of plan 
that households choose, both one and two-source households are less likely to enroll in 
plans with a freedom of choice of provider, which is surprising, having controlled for 
price differences.       
  We find strong support for the effect of price on health plan choice:  households 
are less likely to choose plan options that have higher out-of-pocket contributions.  Price-
sensitivity also varies with several household attributes.  Married households, those with 
children, and households that have a federal government worker exhibit a larger response 
to price changes, while higher income households appear to be less sensitive to price.  
For our two-source households, we find that wealthier households, as measured by our 
1040 proxy, tend to be less price-sensitive.   
C. Elasticity Estimates 
  Table 6 presents three sets of elasticities to examine the magnitude of behavioral 
responses exhibited by households to changes in the price of coverage.  Own-price 
elasticities are calculated to measure the extent of health plan switching within a 
particular plan type (e.g., switching from one EPO plan to another EPO), while cross-
price elasticties measure the willingness to substitute from one type to another (e.g., 
switching from an EPO to a mixed provider plan).  It is worth noting that the well-known 
                                                                                                                                                 
of choice of provider.   The results from both models are qualitatively similar to our multinomial logit 
results.  The nested logit results are reported in the Appendix.       17
result that elasticities in multinomial logit models depend only upon choice probabilities 
and the price coefficient is true here only at the individual level:  “market” own and cross 
price elasticities depend also upon the distribution of household characteristics, which we 
observe at the individual level.  The third is an overall demand elasticity, which provides 
a measure of choosing the outside good, in other words not taking up any employer-based 
coverage, when contributions increase for all available plans. 
  With health plan options varying by coverage type, plan type, and even the 
number of plans, it is necessary to modify conventional interpretation methods.  Rather 
than estimating the magnitude of the effect in terms of changes in probability, our 
calculation of elasticities is made in terms of changes in expected covered lives for EPOs, 
mixed provider plans (MIX), any provider plans (ANY), and the outside good.  For each 
option in a household’s choice set, we calculated covered lives by allocating the number 
of household members to each of the four categories above based on information about 
plan type(s) and coverage type(s).  For example, if a household has three members and 
the option is an any provider plan with single coverage, then there are zero EPO covered 
lives, zero MIX covered lives, one ANY covered life, and two outside good covered 
lives.
19  Expected covered lives were then calculated for each option by multiplying the 
predicted probability of an option by the covered lives for each category, and then 
summing over all of the options in the household’s choice set.   
                                                 
19 For two-source household options including two plans, this is more complicated.  For example, two 
source households with options including two family coverage plans of different types had their members 
split equally.  So, for a household with three members, if the option contains an ANY plan with family 
coverage and an EPO plan with family coverage, then there are 1.5 ANY covered lives, 1.5 EPO covered 
lives, 0 MIX covered lives, and zero outside good covered lives.   18
Marginal effects were calculated discretely, given the presence of household 
interactions with contribution and the complex nature of households’ options.
20  Marginal 
effects were computed for four different contribution increases: an increase in the 
contribution of EPO plans; an increase in the contribution of ANY plans; an increase in 
the contribution of MIX plans; and an increase in the contribution of all plans.   
In Table 6, the first set of estimates corresponds to the average behavioral response 
for all households, while the second set represents the average behavioral response 
exhibited by the subset of households having the particular plan types in their choice sets.  
Own-price elasticity estimates range from -.13 to -.15 for any provider plans, -.13 to -.14 
for EPOs, and -.19 to -.27 for mixed provider plans, while cross-price elasticity estimates 
range from .02 to .32.    As expected, EPOs and mixed provider plans are perceived as 
closer substitutes relative to any provider plans.  Estimates of the average elasticity of 
expected outside good covered lives with respect to the contribution suggests that raising 
all plan contributions leads to a small decrease in the take-up rate by households.  For 
one-source households, we estimate this overall demand elasticity to be .21, which is 
somewhat larger than what was found by Blumberg et al (2002). 
Overall, the results suggest that there would be a small behavioral response in 
terms of switching within and across plan types associated with changing plan 
contributions.  The elasticities reported here are smaller in magnitude than estimates 
found in other recent studies of health plan choice such as Royalty and Solomon (1999), 
                                                 
20 To calculate the marginal effect of a change in contribution on expected covered lives, we increased the 
contribution by $1, adjusting the values of all interaction terms in the model, re-computed the option 
probabilities for every household, calculated new values for our expected covered lives, and took the 
difference with the baseline expected covered lives to obtain the marginal effect.     19
Cutler and Reber (1998) and Buchmueller and Feldstein (1997).   One possible reason is 
greater plan heterogeneity available to the households in our sample, as compared to the 
aforementioned studies in which plan choices are more similar (e.g., all managed care 
plans), and in some cases, have standardized benefit structures.  Greater product 
differentiation may provide a partial explanation for smaller price elasticities.  
Additionally, there may be unobserved plan characteristics within households’ choice 
sets that are correlated with the contribution, subsequently resulting in attenuation bias on 
our price-sensitivity estimates (Berry et al, 1995).   One example of omitted variables 
could be perceived health plan quality, such as reputation or the size of the provider 
panel.   
VI.  Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 
A.  Discussion 
 
While the own and cross-price elasticity estimates provide insights regarding how 
changes in contribution affect switching between plan types, another concern of 
employers pertains to the costs they bear with respect to subsidizing family coverage, 
particularly when a worker has access to coverage through a spouse.  Dranove et al 
(2000) examine the issue of “employer competition” to be the employer not chosen to 
sponsor coverage for a worker when he or she has another potential source.  Results from 
their analysis provide indirect evidence to support this form of “employer competition.”    
While changing the benefits and increasing contribution requirements are two ways to   20
engage in this form of “competition”, another way is to establish an “opt-out” provision, 
or cash payment to a worker who chooses not to take up any coverage.
21   
From an employer’s perspective, the cost-effectiveness of offering an opt-out 
provision depends on the extent to which employees switch from taking up coverage to 
not taking up coverage, the amount of the payment, and the employer-portion of health 
insurance costs.  To be cost-effective, the savings generated from not having to pay the 
employer portion of health insurance costs for those who opt out must be greater than the 
new costs associated with the payments made to workers who choose not to take up 
coverage.  
We estimate the cost-effectiveness of four different opt-out payments ($400, 
$600, $800, and $1000) for the employers of the households in our sample using 
information on the employer-portion of health insurance costs and the change in 
probability of an employee taking up coverage with his or her own employer.  A more 
detailed explanation of the methodology can be found in the Appendix.   For our two-
source households, the average baseline probability of a worker in the household 
selecting an option that includes a plan sponsored by his or her own employer is .8.  
Making a $1000 opt-out payment available to these workers leads to a reduction in the 
average probability of taking up coverage of .19, or a 24% decrease in the take-up rate.  
As expected, the effect is somewhat smaller for our households with only one source of 
coverage.  For this group, the probability of selecting an option that includes an 
employer-sponsored plan is .89.  Again, making the opt-out provision available leads to a 
                                                 
21 In 1999, approximately 14% of all workers were employed in firms offering such a provision (Gabel et 
al, 2000).   21
15 point decrease in the probability of taking up coverage, or an approximate 17% 
decline in the take-up rate.   
With information on the employer-portion of the total premium for each plan, we 
also estimated how the average cost per employee for providing health care coverage 
changes as a result of enacting this compensation policy.   Table 7 reports the average 
cost per employee under the four opt-out payment levels.  We find that for employers of 
both household types, establishing this provision can reduce employers’ costs, though we 
find it to be more cost-effective for the employers of two-source households.  For 
example, if a $1000 opt-out payment is offered, we find that for employers of the one-
source households, their average cost per employee decreases $31 from $2,337 to $2,306, 
whereas, for employers of the two-source households the average cost per employee falls 
between $83 and $133.   Relating these results back to the model proposed in Dranove et 
al (2000), our findings provide direct evidence that opt-out provisions influence behavior 
of workers with respect to taking up coverage and may serve to provide another method 
by which employers compete to not be chosen when workers have an alternative source 
of coverage. 
B.  Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we estimate a model of household demand for employer-based 
health insurance using the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey.  We find that factors 
such as household income, wealth, family size, and having a household member 
employed by the federal government all significantly affect health insurance demand.  
Most notably, our empirical results suggest that households are less likely to choose a 
plan option requiring a higher employee contribution, ceteris paribus.    22
Demand elasticities reveal an overall, small behavioral response to changes in the 
price of coverage as it relates to health plan switching and the decision to take up any 
employer-based coverage.   While we find no significant differences between households 
with one source of coverage and those with two potential sources of coverage, we do find 
that households with a second source of coverage are more likely to switch from taking-
up to not taking-up coverage from a particular employer source when offered alternative 
compensation, such as an opt-out provision. 
Our results also have important policy implications.  As policymakers consider 
proposals to make health insurance more affordable to the uninsured through the use of 
subsidies or tax credits, the effectiveness of these programs depends critically on whether 
households will choose to take up coverage given these reductions in the price.  What our 
results suggest is that in order for such programs to have an impact on reducing the 
number of uninsured, the tax credits or vouchers would have to be quite large.      
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Table 1:  Distribution of Plans Available 
 










Percentage Counts  of 
Households 
Percentage 
1 667  45.04  0  0 
2 239 16.1  56  28.45 
3 131 8.85  27  11.64 
4 141 9.52  28  12.07 
5 21 1.42  24  10.34 
6 15 1.01  11  4.74 
7 9  .61  11  4.74 
8 10  .68  5  2.16 
9 13  .88  5  2.16 
10+ 235  15.89  75  32.3 
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Table 2:  Household Attributes 
 




Variable Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Family size=1 
 
.39* .49  ….  …. 
Family size=2  ….  ….  .42  .49 
Married .48  .5  1  0 
Household wage 
income ($) 
38,186* 27,292  62,684  32,201 
File1040 .47*  .5  .66  .48 
Medical conditions 
per capita 
.43* .75  .38  .52 
Federal government 
worker in the 
household 
.09* .28  .09  .28 
Number of kids 0-18  .77  1.07  1.00  1.14 
* Indicates that the average value for the households in the final estimation sample is 
significantly different (p<.05) from the average value for the eligible households that did 
not meet the “completeness of information” criteria.  There are 2,415 one-source and 785 
two-source households that did not meet the “completeness of information” criteria.  The 
completeness criteria includes having a link to the employer; knowing the plan type; 
knowing the contributions for each option.  
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Table 3:  Plan Characteristics 
  One-source households  Two-source Households 
Variable Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Single contribution 
($100s) 
3.80 4.74  3.34  4.35 
Family contribution 
($100s) 
14.17 12.20  14.35  11.69 
Individual 
deductible ($) 
131.6 340.5  148.7  442 
Outpatient 
coinsurance (%) 
8.9 5.3  9.24  6.13 
Exclusive provider 
organization (EPO) 
.532 .5  .54  .5 
Mixed provider 
organization (MIX) 
.384 .49  .38  .49 
Any provider plan 
(ANY) 
.083 .28  .082  .27 
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Table 4:  Multinomial logit – One-source households 
Variable Name  Parameter Estimate Standard  Error 
Contribution -.084***  .0009 
Family size 1*Contribution  -.19***  .02 
Married*Contribution -.066***  .012 
Ln Income*Contribution  .016*  .008 
File 1040*Contribution  .017  .01 
Medical conditions*Contribution  -.012  .008 
Government*Contribution -.053**  .022 
Number of kids*Contribution  -.027***  .005 
Family size 1*FOC  .252  .302 
Family size 1*Family coverage  ….  …. 
Family size1*Outside good  -.595  .456 
Married*FOC .453*  .266 
Married*Family coverage  3.20***  .212 
Married*Outside good  1.64***  .382 
Ln Income*FOC  .108  .144 
Ln Income*Family coverage  .122  .169 
Ln Income*Outside good  -.64***  .20 
File 1040*FOC  .084  .19 
File 1040*Family coverage  .158  .213 
File 1040*Outside good  -.113  .292 
Medical conditions*FOC  .169  .124 
Medical conditions*Family coverage  -.058  .127 
Medical conditions*Outside good  -.381*  .215 
Government*FOC  .014 .23 
Government*Family coverage  .411  .324 
Government*Outside good  2.22*** .431 
Number of kids*FOC  -.187* .108 
Number of kids*Family coverage  1.266*** .12 
Number of kids*Outside good  .456** .183 
FOC  -.249** .10 
Family coverage  .39*** .106 
Outside good  -1.28***  .178 
Deductible .0000  .0001 
Coinsurance rate  .016**  .009 
    
Number of households  1481   
LR (33)  1429.1  
Pseudo R
2 .265   
    
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level 
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Table 5:  Multinomial logit – Two-source Households 
Variable Name  Parameter Estimate  Standard Error 
Contribution -.09***  .03 
Family size 2*Contribution  -.008  .03 
Ln Income*Contribution  -.024  .02 
File 1040*Contribution  .064***  .024 
Medical conditions*Contribution  -.006  .018 
Government*Contribution -.04  .04 
Number of kids*Contribution  -.002  .014 
Family size 2*All covered  .377  1.21 
Family size 2*FOC Provider  -1.02*  .62 
Ln Income*All covered  1.27  .835 
Ln Income*FOC Provider  -.165  .422 
File 1040*All covered  -.026  .847 
File 1040*FOC Provider  -.275  .429 
Medical conditions*All covered  .468  1.022 
Medical conditions*FOC Provider  .274  .365 
Government*All covered  -1.05  1.28 
Government*FOC Provider  -.622  .585 
Number of kids*All covered  .261  .513 
Number of kids*FOC Provider  -.478  .295 
All covered  3.96***  .496 
FOC Provider  -.905***  .202 
Average deductible  -.0008**  .0004 
Average coinsurance rate  .03  .023 
    
Number of households  232   
LR (23)  265.3   
Pseudo R
2 .165   
*significant at the .10 level ** significant at the .05 level *** significant 
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Table 6:  Average Elasticity Estimates (standard errors in parentheses) 
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Table 7:  Average Cost Per Employee with Opt-Out Provision
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2 EPOs - 7 
2 MIX - 2 
2 ANY - 15 
EPO/MIX - 10 
EPO/ANY - 3 
MIX/ANY – 3 
2 EPOs - 11 
2 MIX - 9 
2 ANY - 3 
EPO/MIX - 14 
EPO/ANY - 2 
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Appendix 
 
One-source households - Nested Logit Estimates 
Twig:  Choice | Inside Good 
 
  Parameter Estimate  Standard Error 
Contribution -.107***  .014 
Family size 1 * 
Contribution 
-.24*** .03 




LnIncome*Contribution .019*  .009 
File1040*Contribution .028**  .013 




Family size 1*FOC  .370  .327 
Married*Family coverage  3.39***  .234 
Married*FOC .388  .291 
Number of kids*FOC  -.167  .118 
Number of kids*Family 
coverage 
1.384*** .140 
LnIncome*FOC .207  .158 
LnIncome*Family coverage  .189  .196 
File1040*FOC .093  .205 
File1040*Family coverage  .085  .240 








FOC -.368***  .113 
Family coverage  .468***  .118 
Coinsurance .014  .01 
Deductible .0000  .0001 
   
Number of households  1358   
LR(25) 1137.09   
Pseudo R2  .26   
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One-source households 
Branch:  Dependent variable - Take up Insurance 
 
  Parameter estimate  Standard error 
Family size 1  .43  .335 
Married -.052  .273 
Number of kids  -.035  .115 
LnIncome .834***  .142 
File 1040  .344  .221 
Government -.996***  .372 
Medical Conditions Per 
Capita 
.399** .18 
Inclusive Value  .353***  .076 
Constant 2.108*** .15 
   
Number of households  1481   
LR(8) 96.94  
Pseudo R2  .11   
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Two-source Households – Nested Logit 
 
Twig:  Freedom of Choice 
 
 









Contribution -.091***  .014  -.16***  .03 
Family size 2 * 
Contribution 
.058 .042  -.20***  .07 
Number of 
kids*Contribution 
.026 .022  -.045  .03 
LnIncome*Contribution -.038*  .022  .025  .046 
File1040*Contribution .11***  .034  -.09*  .048 
Government*Contribution .04  .037  -.49***  .138 
Medical conditions per 
capita*Contribution 
.016 .02    
All covered  4.13  .751  5.34  .987 
All covered*Family size 2  -.286  1.64  2.501  2.34 
All covered*Number of 
kids 
-.142 .70  .919  .958 
All covered*Ln Income  1.55  1.17  2.75  1.803 
All covered*File 1040  -.573  1.14  1.65  1.64 
All covered*Medical 
conditions per capita 
.597 1.56  -.772  1.39 
Deductible -.0007*  .0004  -.005  .004 
Coinsurance .031  .029  .027  .066 
        
LR(15) 151.97    118.64   
Pseudo R2  .17    .24   
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Two-source Households 
Branch:  Take up Coverage 
 
  Parameter Estimate  Standard error 
Family size 2  -2.51***  .738 
Number of kids  -1.07***  .34 
Ln Income  .206  .427 
File 1040  -1.24***  .48 
Government -3.92***  .916 
Medical conditions per 
capita 
-.058 .360 
Inclusive Value  -.62***  .123 
Constant -.835*** .275 
   
Number of households  164   
LR(7) 42.38  
Pseudo R2  .19   
 
 
Elasticity Estimates using Nested Logit Results 
 


















EPO,EPO -.15  -.15  -.16  -.16 
MIX, MIX  -.18  -.18  -.27  -.27 
ANY, ANY  -.15  -.15  -.13  -.13 
EPO, MIX  .14  .25  .14  .15 
MIX, EPO  .09  .29  .19  .35 
EPO, ANY  .04  .15  -.04  -.04 
ANY, EPO  .08  .29  .10  .22 
MIX, ANY  .02  .19  .04  .13 
ANY, MIX  .07  .20  .15  .12 
Outside good, 
all plans 
.09 ….  ….     40
 
Opt-Out Payment Exercise Methodology 
 
Employer Benefit Design: 
(1) Switching 










P P and P P
P P P
, ,  
J options including plan(s) sponsored by employer 
P
B:  Baseline probability of choosing an option with a plan sponsored by employer 
P
N:  New probability of choosing an option with a plan sponsored by employer given 
 the opt out payment 
Pb,i:  Baseline probability of choosing option i in household’s choice set 
Pn,i:  New probability of choosing option I in household’s choice set given opt out 
payment 
(2) Cost-Effectiveness of “opt out” provision:  This is done by comparing the average 
cost per employee for health insurance before implementation of an “opt out” 
provision (AC




B:  Baseline average cost per employee 
      ECb:  Baseline employer portion of total premium 
      ECn:  Baseline employer portion for plans, but opt out payment for “outside good” 